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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(a).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Did the Court ofAppeals err when it ruled that the plaintiffs' claims (R.72-91)

were not barred by the 4-year statute of limitations, U.C.A.§ 78-12-25(3).
Standard of review: Because this case was before the Court on motions to
dismiss, the decision of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals are conclusions of law,
reviewed for correctness. Orton v. Carter, 970 P. 2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998).
Issue preserved for appeal: This issue was central both to the trial court's
ruling and the ruling ofthe Court ofAppeals, Russell/Packard Dev. v. Carson, 2003 UT App.
316,111. The issue was first raised in Carson's motion to dismiss, R.31-52.
GOVERNING LAW
The interpretation of U.C.A. § 78-12-25(3) is central to the outcome of this appeal.
U.C.A. § 78-12-25(3) states simply that: "An action may be brought within four years:...
(3) for relief not otherwise provided for by law."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the case. The case addresses the application of the statute of

limitations and the "discovery rule" to claims arising out of real estate contracts which were
allegedly concealed from the plaintiffs.
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B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below.

In icspon'ii: tu 11 iv uiii'iiijl Complaint, each of the defendants filed a motion to
dismiss. (R.29, 56, 51.) Russell responded to the motions with a memorandum (R.58) and
an amended complaint. (R.72.)
A hearing was had in the Third District Coiii t, Salt Lake County, on the motions to
dismiss on April 29,2002, at which time Judge Frederick dismissed the amended complaint
in its entirety. (R.149.) Plaintiffs' counsel did not ask for leave to file a second amended
complaint.
Russell appealed Judge Frederick's decision Tin; Utah Com t of Appeals, Judges
I ient h, Tlion

killings, reversed the trial court's dismissal of the action and remanded

the case for further proceedings on every cause of action. Russell/Packard Dev. v. Carson,
2003 UT App 316, ^ 36, 78 P. 3d 616 at 627. The defendants petitioned this Courl for
certiorari. The petition was granted. Russell/Packard Dev. v. Carson, 2004 UT

(January

2,2004).
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED
Because this matter is before the Court on a motion to dismiss, all oft lie facts alleged
by the plaintiffs (R.72-90) must be accept ct) as due. St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's
Hosp., 8i i '. 2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991). The following are excerpts of facts material to the
legal issues presented:

2
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1.

Prior to November, 1996, when the Real Estate Purchase Contracts (REPC)

that are the subject of the amended complaint were entered into, Russell and Thomas were
partners in a limited liability company, PRP. (R.72, <flf 5, 18.) Thomas was the manager of
PRP, and an agent and fiduciary of Russell. (R.73, f 5; R.76, f 26.)
2. Carson and Bustos were real estate agents for Wardley Better Homes and Gardens
("Wardley"). (R.74, f 10.) It was alleged that Carson, Bustos and Thomas all had prior
business dealings together. (R.76,fflf22-26.) It was also alleged that Thomas owed Bustos
money at the time of these transactionsfromearlier business dealings between them. (R.76,
125.)
3.

In the summer of 1996, Joel Carson showed John Thomas undeveloped lots at

Saratoga Springs that were available for sale. (R.76,fflf26,29.) These lots were owned by
Saratoga Springs Development, L.L.C., and were listed and being marketed by Wardley.
Carson and Bustos were real estate agents for Wardley. (R.76, f 21; R.73,ffl[3,4.)
4.

In fact, PRP did not make an offer to purchase the lots until after CMT, an entity

which Russell alleges was a sham, had contracted to purchase the lots from Saratoga for
$25,000.00 per lot on November 8, 1996. (R.77,fflf33, 50.) After CMT contracted to
purchase the lots, it agreed to resell them to PRP pursuant to a separate contract at a price of
$30,000.00 per lot. (R.79, A. Complaint,ffl[44, 45.)
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5.

Russell contends that this was a "flip sale" designed to benefit the defendants

to the detriment of Russell, and that the first sale from Saratoga to CMT was not disclosed
to Russell. (R.72, 1H[ 77, 105.)
6.

All ofRussell's claims for relief are based on the contention that the defendants

failed to disclose to him that CMT and the original owner of the lots, Saratoga Springs, were
not one and the same. (SeeR.83, Tf 77; R.85, TJTf 85, 86; R.87, Tf 96; R.87, IJTf 98,100;R.88,
H 105; R.89,ffi[107,108.) Russell also alleged that until the spring of 2000, the defendants
"concealed" this information from him. (R.80ffl[52-54.)
7.

In fact, CMT had no relationship to either Saratoga or PRP. (R.72, ^ 52.)

8.

There was no allegation in either complaint (R.1 and 72) that the defendants

Carson or Bustos ever misrepresented the (lack of) relationship between CMT and Saratoga
to Russell. The alleged misrepresentation plead in paragraph 65 of the amended complaint
(R.82) was as follows: "Defendants represented to Saratoga that CMT was part of,
affiliated with, or owned by plaintiffs." The first cause of action goes on to allege that
because Saratoga believed CMT was affiliated with PRP, "Saratoga sold the lots to
CMT...." (A. Complaint, R.72,^| 68.)
9.

Russell plead, and thus admits, that: "Saratoga . . . was then [spring of 2000]

placed on inquiry notice that CMT may not have been the agent or under the control of
plaintiffs and, after discussions with Saratoga's representatives in the spring of 2000,
plaintiffs were first placed on inquiry notice ofCMT"s control status as well." (R.81 *[[ 58,
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emphasis added.) This admission was subsequently confirmed on a number of occasions by
the plaintiffs. In their opening brief before the Court of Appeals, page 17, Russell admitted
that they "learned for the first time in the spring of 2000 that CMT was not associated with
Saratoga, which was approximately five months prior to the expiration of the four year
limitations period

" Russell also acknowledged, at page 11 of Plaintiffs' Memorandum

in Opposition to the Motions to Dismiss (R.69), that he was placed on "inquiry notice"
regarding the alleged fraud in the spring of 2000. During the course of oral argument before
the trial court, Russell's counsel again conceded that Russell had discovered the alleged fraud
in 2000 during "[t]he final take down of the last 12 lots where someone in Saratoga's
organization is going through the paperwork . . . . " (Page 32 of Transcript, R.207.)
10.

Russell has also admitted that any alleged "fraudulent concealment" ended in

the spring of 2000. (R.81, f59.)
11.

Russells' amended complaint (R.82,f60) alleges that: "After the conversation

with Saratoga's representative [in the spring of 2000] concerning CMT's actual status,
further inquiry and investigation were made by the plaintiffs concerning the ownership and
control of CMT and the circumstances of the two contracts signed in November 1996 by
plaintiffs and Saratoga." No additional allegations were made by Russell about the plaintiffs'
efforts or inability, if any, to discover additional facts. At page 17 of their opening brief in
the Court of Appeals, Russell asserted that "they did not discover actual facts forming the
basis for their causes of action until after the November 7, 2001 [sic] deadline." There is

5
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nothing in the record to support this last statement. There is nothing in RusselPs
amended complaint (R.72) or in Russell's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss (R.59) to suggest why Russell now claims it took one and one half more
years to confirm or leam more about what Saratoga told it in the spring of 2000. Russell
never asked the trial court to supplement the record on this issue.
12.

Russell conceded before the Court of Appeals, in oral argument, that absent

tolling the six claims addressed in this brief [breach of fiduciary duty, civil conspiracy,
unjust enrichment, conversion, breach of principal agency relationship, and intentional
interference] covered by the four year statute of limitations (U.C. A. § 78-12-25(3)) would
have expired on November 7,2000, and that plaintiffs' November 30,2001 complaint would
be untimely. (2003 UT App 316, ^ 11.)
13.

Russell conceded before the Court of Appeals, during oral argument, that its

commercial bribery claim should be dismissed. (Transcript, p. 17, Appendix) This claim
should have been dismissed by the Court of Appeals, but it did not address the concession
in its opinion.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The first issue before this Court is whether the six claims covered by the 4-year statute
of limitations, U.C.A. § 78-12-25(3), are time barred and should be dismissed as a matter
of law. In this case, where the plaintiffs (i) admitted knowing of the alleged fraud and (ii)
were on inquiry notice of their claim well before the limitations period expired, and (iii)
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failed to make an initial showing that they did not know and could not reasonably have
discovered the facts underlying the cause of action in time to commence an action within that
period, the claims are barred. Because the Russell plaintiffs (referred to in this brief
collectively as "Russell") had knowledge of their claims before the expiration of the statute
of limitations, the "discovery rule" does not extend the statute of limitations for them.
The second issue is the result of an oversight by the Court of Appeals. Their decision
failed to acknowledge plaintiffs' concession during oral argument that their commercial
bribery claim should be dismissed. This Court should dismiss the commercial bribery claim.
This appeal does not address the plaintiffs' fraud claim (R.82, first cause of action),
which is governed by a different statute of limitations, and was not raised in the Petition.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN DISMISSING
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS COVERED BY U.C.A. § 78-12-25(3).

Carson and Bustos acknowledge that for purposes of motions to dismiss, courts must
accept the factual allegations in the [amended] complaint as true and that dismissal should
be affirmed only if it clearly appears that the plaintiffs can prove no set of facts in support
of their cause of action. Wright v. Univ. of Utah, 876 P.2d 380 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
The amended complaint (R.72 ) asserted eight causes of action. In their argument
before the Court of Appeals, Russell conceded that the commercial bribery claim did not
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state a claim for relief. (See Point II below.) The fraud claim is not at issue in this appeal
because it was not addressed in the Petition for Certiorari.
It is the six remaining claims in the amended complaint (breach of fiduciary duty, civil
conspiracy, unjust enrichment, conversion, breach of principal agency relationship, and
intentional interference) (R.72) that are addressed in this brief.
The parties agree that the four year statute of limitations, U.C.A. § 78-12-25(3),
applies to each of these six claims. (Russell's opening brief in Court of Appeals, p. 11, also
R.64). Russell has conceded that absent tolling of U.C.A. § 78-12-25(3) through application
ofthe "discovery rule," the point at which Russell reasonably should have known of its legal
injuries was November 8, 1996. (2003 UT App 316, % 12.)
There is but one "discovery rule" in Utah which is recognized to apply in three
situations: "(1) in situations where the discovery rule is mandated by statute; (2) in situations
where a plaintiff does not become aware of the cause of action because of the defendant's
concealment or misleading conduct [which is alleged here]; and (3) in situations where the
case presents exceptional circumstances and the application of the general rule would be
irrational or unjust, regardless of any showing that the defendant has prevented the discovery
of the cause of action." See Walker Drug Co. v. La Sal Oil Co., 902 P. 2d 1229 at 1231 (Utah
1995).
There is no internal discovery rule in U.C.A. § 78-12-25(3). Russell has conceded
that the "exceptional circumstances," or third prong of the discovery rule does not apply.
8
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(R.66.) As a result, it is only the "concealment," or second prong of the "discovery rule"
which can be relied upon by Russell to support his otherwise untimely filing ofthe six claims
at issue here.
The question presented in the Court of Appeals, and now before this Court, is this:
In cases under the "concealment" prong of the "discovery rule,"
where the concealment is alleged to be fraudulent, but the
alleged concealment ends prior to the expiration ofthe statute of
limitations, and where the injured party discovers the allegedly
fraudulently withheld fact prior to the expiration of the statute
of limitations, does the alleged fraudulent concealment still toll
the statute of limitations?
The District Court answered the question "no." The Court of Appeals answered the
question "yes."1
Russell's argument and the Court of Appeals' decision that Russell was entitled to
bring these claims after November of 2000 fail for at least two reasons:
Initially, the Russell plaintiffs have admitted that they were on inquiry notice of their
claims in June of 2000, and thus, are held to have knowledge within time to initiate their
claims before the statute expired in November, 2000.

1

The Court of Appeals stated in its opinion that Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45
(Utah 1996) controls the outcome of this case. (See f 15, footnote 7 of the Opinion.)
Berenda focused on how to apply the discovery rule in a case where the statute of
limitations (•§ 78-12-27) contained an express discovery rule (the first prong of the
discovery rule). (See Berenda, p. 51, n.2.) Berenda does not "control" in cases where the
statute of limitations at issue (here, U.C.A. § 78-12-25(3)) contains no internal discovery
rule.
9
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Second, even if Russell did not have full knowledge of every detail of their claim in
June 2000, they failed to make any initial showing that they could not have known of their
claims prior to November 2000 when the statute of limitations expired.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is inconsistent with existing Utah case law on
the issues presented, and should be vacated.
A.

Russell had knowledge within the statute of limitations period.

In Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P. 2d 1125 (Utah 1992), this Court observed as
follows:
The concealment version of the discovery rule is essentially a
claim of equitable estoppel.... Therefore, in order to invoke the
concealment version of the discovery rule it must be shown that
given the defendant's actions, a reasonable plaintiff would not
have brought suit within the statutory period, (at 1129-30.)
In determining whether or not "discovery rule" should apply, this Court has
consistently held that "[t]he Discovery Rule has no application when an action easily could
have been filed between the date of discovery and the end of the limitation period." Brigham
Young Univ. v. Poulsen Const, 744 P.2d 1370 at 1374 (Utah 1987).
This rule was applied to U.C.A. § 78-12-25(3), the statute at issue here, in Atwood v.
Sturm, Ruger & Co., 823 P.2d 1064 (Utah 1992). In the Atwood case, this Court determined
that where the cause of action was discovered in the spring of 1998 and could have been filed
before the statute of limitations ran in October of 1988, the discovery rule did not extend the
time for filing the action. AtwooddX 1064. In short, there is no tolling under U.C.A. §78-12-
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25(3) if the facts giving rise to the claim were or reasonably could have been known prior
to the expiration of the four year statute.
Utah courts have long recognized that the means of knowledge is the equivalent of
knowledge. In U.P.C., Inc. v. R.O.A. Gen., Inc., 1999 UT App 303,136-38, 990 P.2d 945,
the Court ofAppeals considered the issue of inquiry notice on a title-related matter. Relying
on an earlier Supreme Court decision, First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. J. B. Ranch, Inc., 966 P.2d
834, 837-38 (Utah 1998), the U.P.C Court stated:
Whatever is notice enough to excite attention and put the party
on his guard and call for inquiry is notice of everything to which
such inquiry might have led. When a person has sufficient
information to lead him to a fact, he shall be deemed conversant
of it.
C/.P.C,990P.2d945,954.
This Court, in Maoris v. Sculptured Software, Inc., 2001 UT 43, % 8, 24 P. 3d 984,
990, stated that:
We have held that all that is required to trigger the statute of
limitations is sufficient information to put plaintiffs on notice to
make further inquiry if they harbor doubts or questions,
(citation omitted). Once inquiry notice triggers the accrual of
the statute of limitations, a claimant may not then toll the
running of the statute under the principle of exceptional
circumstances. (Emphasis added.)
While Macris was an "exceptional circumstances5' case, there is no policy reason why the
same reasoning should not apply to cases under the "concealment" prong of the discovery
rule.
11
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The Court of Appeals' discussion of this issue reveals fundamental flaws in their
analysis. The Court of Appeals failed to recognize any difference between the internal
discovery rule of U.C.A. § 78-12-26(3) (which says that the cause of action does not accrue
until the discovery of the facts constituting fraud) and the judicially created concealment
version of the discovery rule as it applies to U.C.A. § 78-12-25. In doing so, they ignored
the clear statements in the Brigham Young Univ. v. Poulsen case and the Atwood v. Sturm
decision that discovery within the statute of limitations period requires commencement of
the claim within the initial four year period.
A second flaw was the Court of Appeals' failure to apply the "inquiry notice"
standard. At Tf 17 of its decision, the Court of Appeals stated that "[i]n the case before us5
neither party alleges, nor does the record reflect, that Russell had or should have had actual
knowledge of its claims against the Appellees [defendants] at the time of the execution of
the PRP contract." Actual knowledge is not the standard. Inquiry notice is the touchstone.
Maoris, supra. It was not necessary that Russell knew of the alleged concealment in 1996
when the CMT-PRP contract was signed, only that inquiry notice existed prior to the running
of U.C.A. § 78-12-25(3) in November, 2000.
The discovery rule relied upon by Russell and the Court of Appeals to extend the
statute of limitations does not contemplate or require full knowledge of every detail of the
alleged wrong. In Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1993), this court discussed the
discovery rule under U.C.A. § 78-12-26(3)(which has an internal discovery rule) as follows:

12
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The words "until the discovery [of fraud]" are generally
interpreted as meaning from the time the fraud was actually
known or could have been discovered through the exercise of
reasonable diligence. Specifically addressing § 78-12-26(3),
this Court stated that the three-year statute of limitations for
fraud "begins to run from the time the person entitled to the
property knows, or by reasonable diligence and inquiry should
know, the relevant facts " of the fraud perpetrated against him.
Furthermore, we have previously observed: "The means of
knowledge is equivalent to knowledge. A party who has
opportunity of knowing the facts constituting the alleged fraud
cannot be inactive and afterwards allege a want of knowledge
that arose by reason of his own laches and negligence."
850 P.2d at 1196 (Emphasis added.)
In the Baldwin case, Burton was attempting to execute on a judgment lien and the question
was whether or not a prior (allegedly fraudulent) transfer of property should have been
discovered by Burton in his effort to levy on a judgment. The allegedly fraudulent transfer
had been recorded at the time Burton's judgment was entered. The Supreme Court observed
that Burton should have searched property records for property upon which to levy when his
judgment was entered, and the Court concluded that the transfer should have been discovered
when Burton obtained his judgment.
Had a search been made, exercising reasonable diligence and
proper prudence, [Burton] surely would have uncovered the
transfer from Wood to his wife. Discovery of the transfer would
then have sparked further inquiry on the part of the Burtons. If
such inquiry had been pursued, the Burtons would have
discovered facts surrounding the allegedly fraudulent
conveyance. At the very least, discovery of the transfer
should have incited suspicion of fraud
However, it is not
necessary for a claimant to know every fact about his fraud
claim before the statute begins to run. The means of knowledge
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were available to the Burtons, and upon obtaining the judgment
against Willard Wood, they should have discovered facts
surrounding the alleged fraud. (Emphasis added.)
850P.2datll97.
Applied to this case, Russell has admitted that they were on inquiry notice of their
claims in June, 2000. (See Statement of Facts above, ^9.) Under the reasoning of Maoris,
U.P. C., and Baldwin, supra, they were then held to know all that a reasonable inquiry would
have disclosed. In addition, these cases make it clear that Russell did not need to discover
every detail of their claim before they were required to file.
In pleadings filed in the Court of Appeals, Russell argued for the first time that it did
not discover all of the facts needed to pursue their claims until after November, 2000. (See
Statement of Facts, \ 11, supra,) Russell has not suggested, even before the Court of
Appeals, what else it had to learn or where it had to go to get additional information after it
was on inquiry notice. They certainly made no mention of it in their amended complaint.
Russell acknowledges that the information allegedly concealed, that CMT was not Saratoga,
was revealed to them by Saratoga in the spring of 2000. (R.81, f 59.) Presumably, because
they have made no showing or allegation to the contrary, Russell was able to gather all of the
information they needed from their own files and the files of Saratoga.
For purposes of the discovery rule, it was enough that Russell had the means to
acquire knowledge of the details. Russell has specifically admitted in their amended
complaint that they were on inquiry notice and that any alleged concealment ended in June
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2000 (R.81, Tffl 58, 59), some five months before the statute of limitations expired. Given
these admissions, there is no reason to extend the statute of limitations on these six claims
beyond November, 2000.
B.

The Russell plaintiffs did not make the required "initial showing" that

they could not reasonably have discovered necessary facts within time.
Even if Russell had not admitted being on "inquiry notice" months before the statute
of limitations expired, they have still failed to satisfy their pleading obligations. Russell has
failed to make any initial showing that they could not have reasonably discovered facts
necessary to their case between June, 2000 when they were placed on inquiry notice, and
November of 2000 when the four year statute of limitations expired.
In Walker Drug Co. v. La Sal Oil Co., 902 P.2d 1229 at 1231 (Utah 1995), this Court
disposed of this issue in a manner that is definitive in this case. In Walker, this Court said
that:
The Walkers assert that the period of limitations was tolled until
1992 under both the exceptional-circumstances and concealment
versions of the discovery rule. We disagree.
Before a period of limitations may be tolled under either of
these versions of the discovery rule, an initial showing must be
made that the plaintiff did not know and could not reasonably
have discovered the facts underlying the cause of action in time
to commence an action within that period. (Emphasis added.)

<

Id. at 1231. The court concluded as follows:
(
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have discovered the facts underlying their causes of action in
time to file their complaint within the statutory period of
limitations commencing in 1986.
M a t 1232.
The application of the rule enunciated in Walker to fraudulent concealment cases was
confirmed in Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 55 (quoting language from Walker Drug
above).
Burkholz v. Joyce, 972 P.2d 1235 (Utah 1998), was a case decided under the
exceptional circumstances prong of the discovery rule. This Court said in Burkholz that:
In an unbroken line of cases dealing with the application of the
discovery rule we have made it very clear that: "Before a period
of limitations may be tolled under the [exceptional
circumstances] version [] of the discovery rule, an initial
showing must be made that the plaintiff did not know and could
not reasonably have discovered the facts underlying the cause
of action in time to commence an action within that period"
Walker Drug, 902 P.2d at 1 2 3 1 . . . .
(972 P.2d at 1237)(Court's emphasis.)
Each of these cases is consistent with an earlier decision, O 'Neal v. Division of Family
Services, 821 P.2d 1139 (Utah 1991). O'Neal presented a claim under the exceptional
circumstances prong of the discovery rule.

This Court observed that to invoke the

exceptional circumstances prong of the discovery rule ". . . the plaintiff must make a
threshold showing that he or she did not know and could not reasonably have known of the
existence of a cause of action. In fact, this requirement would seem a definitional
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prerequisite to reliance on any version of the discovery rule, judicial or legislative...." 821
P.2datll44.
Russell's pleadings in this action provide all of the information necessary for a
decision by this Court on this issue, applying the Walker Drug and Burkholz standards. In
paragraphs 55 and 58 ofthe amended complaint, Russell admits that they discovered the fact
allegedly concealed from them in the spring of 2000; and in paragraph 59 admits that active
concealment by the defendants ended in the spring of 2000. (R.81.) Russell admits in
paragraph 58 of the Amended complaint (R.81) that in the spring of 2000 they were placed
on "inquiry notice" of CMT's status.
Before the trial court, plaintiffs' counsel admitted that the alleged fraud was
discovered in June 2000. (Tr. 32, R.207.) At page 17 of their opening brief in the Court of
Appeals, Russell asserted that "they did not discover actual facts forming the basis for their
causes of action until after the November 7,2001 [sic] deadline." There is no allegation in
the amended complaint or elsewhere in the record to support this statement made by
Russell's counsel for the first time in their brief on appeal. Under the rule discussed in
Walker, supra at 1231, Russell had a duty to make an initial showing in the trial court that

<

they "did not know and could not reasonably have discovered thefacts underlying the cause
of action in time to commence an action within that period." Russell's amended complaint
makes no attempt to do this. There was no argument advanced before the trial court, either
in pleadings or at oral argument, that (i) the plaintiff needed to engage in a fact finding

I
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mission on the issue of when it should have discovered additional facts, or (ii) that they had
not discovered additional facts necessary for its claims until after November 2000. (R.207.)
In their objection to the petition filed in this Court, Russell relied on the Hill case,
infra, to justify their untimely filing. The following analysis was laid out in Hill v. Alfred,
2001 UT 16, \ 17, 28 P.3d 1271, 1276.
[Where] a plaintiff alleges that a defendant took affirmative
steps to conceal a plaintiffs cause of action... the plaintiff can
avoid the full operation of the discovery rule by making a prima
facie showing of fraudulent concealment and then
demonstrating that given the defendant's actions, a reasonable
plaintiffwould not have discovered the claim earlier. (Citations
omitted, emphasis added.)
Hill, however, is distinguishable from this case on a core essential. In Hill, the plaintiff
suffered a loss in 1989. In July of 1995, after the statute of limitations had otherwise run,
Hill learned for the first time from investigators she had employed that two of the defendants
had absconded with her money. In Hill, the concealment extended beyond the statute of
limitations cutoff. In this case, Russell admits the alleged concealment ended five months
before the statute of limitations expired, and that from June through November they were on
"inquiry notice" of the claims that were dismissed by the trial court. (R.81/|ffl 55, 58, 59.)
Any argument by Russell that more time was needed also fails under the reasoning
of this Court in Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1992). In that case, this
Court held that if there were no representations by the defendant, there can be no showing
that the defendant's actions prevented the discovery of the cause of action. Id. at 1130. In
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this case, Russell has conceded that defendants' alleged concealment ended in the spring of
2000. (R.81, If 59.) Under the rule applied in the Warren case, after the spring of 2000 there
can be no showing that defendants' actions prevented Russell's discovery of his claims.
Two other cases cited by and relied upon by the Court of Appeals in its decision
involved scenarios where the concealment continued beyond the statute of limitations. Seale
v. Gowans, 923 P.2d 1361 (Utah 1996) (cited by the Court of Appeals at \ 15), was a case
that involved the medical malpractice statute of limitations, U.C.A. § 78-14-4. This case was
not discussed by either party in briefing before the Court of Appeals. The Seale case is
readily distinguishable from the facts of this case. The issue in Seale was not when the
plaintiff became aware of the negligence, but whether she had sufficient injury to be in a
position to initiate an action when she first learned of the negligence. In Seale, the defendant
doctor missed a diagnosis of breast cancer. Several years later, after the statute of limitations
had otherwise run, the cancer spread to other parts of the plaintiffs body. The holding of the
case was that "damages in the form of an enhanced risk only are not sufficient to start the
statute of limitations." 923 P.2d at 1365.
Another case relied upon by the Court of Appeals in its decision was Chapman v.
Primary Childrens Hosp., 784 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1989) (see fflf 25, 27 of the decision).
Chapman is also distinguishable on the basis that the defendants there continued to
misrepresent information to the plaintiff even after the statute of limitations would have run.
Russell admits that this did not happen in this case.
i
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At page 13 ofRusseir s Opposition to the Petition for Certiorari, Russell argued, based
upon Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 51 (Utah 1996), that the plaintiff need only allege
that a defendant took affirmative steps to conceal the plaintiffs cause of action to warrant
an extension of the statute of limitations. This argument exposes a fundamental shortcoming
in Russell's position, and in the decision of the Court of Appeals. In this case, Russell has
conceded that the concealment ended at the same time they were placed on inquiry notice in
the spring of 2000. If the alleged concealment had continued beyond November of 2000, the
allegation of concealment alone might have been enough to survive defendants' motion to
dismiss. The distinguishing factor in this case, and what distinguishes it from the likes of
Berenda, Hill and Chapman, supra, is that it is admitted that the alleged concealment ended
and "inquiry notice" existed at least five months prior to the running of the statute of
limitations.
In this case, Russell's injury (if it occurred at all) is allegedly based on contracts made
in 1996. In June of 2000, the alleged misrepresentation was brought to Russell's attention
by Saratoga, a party to the initial CMT contract. (R.207, at page 32.) Russell was a party to
the second contract with CMT. The only thing Russell needed to do to become fully aware
that they had suffered what they believed was an injury was to ask Saratoga for a copy of the
Saratoga/CMT contract and compare it to the CMT/PRP contract, something they could have
done in June of 2000. These contracts would have disclosed the difference in the purchase
price, the fact that Carson was an agent in the transaction, and the fact that Thomas had
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signed the contracts. Russell could then have made additional inquiry of the title companies
where the closing occurred. The record created by Russell in this case offers no insight into
what may have hindered discovery of any additional facts needed to file this action until after
November of 2000 when the statute of limitations otherwise expired. There was no
allegation that things ostensibly learned after June of 2000, when Russell admits they were
on inquiry notice, could not have been learned prior to November of 2000.
The critical thing here is that Russell has made no "initial showing" that they did not
or could not have done these things before the statute of limitations otherwise ran in
November, 2000. Russell has not met the "initial showing" described in both Hill and
Maoris to justify any extension of the statute of limitations beyond November of 2000.
Russell has had two opportunities to plead facts sufficient to satisfy the requirements
of the "initial showing" requirement of Walker, and has failed to do so. Based on the
admissions that Russell has made, both in their pleadings and in arguments before lower
courts, it must be assumed that Russell's failure to plead that they could not have discovered
all of the facts related to their alleged injury before the statute of limitations ran is based on
the fact that they cannot do so.

. , .

For these reasons, the decision of the Court of Appeals should be reversed and the
plaintiffs' claims for breach of fiduciary duty (R.83), civil conspiracy (R.85), unjust
enrichment (R.87), conversion (R.87), breach ofprincipal-fiduciary relationship (R.88), and
interference with economic relations (R.89) should each be dismissed.
i
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II.

PLAINTIFFS' COMMERCIAL BRIBERY CLAIM WAS
CONCEDED BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS, AND
SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED BY THAT COURT.

During the course of oral argument before the Court of Appeals, counsel for Russell
conceded their claim for commercial bribery. (Transcript of Hearing before Court of
Appeals, page 17, line 3; Appendix.) The Court of Appeals committed plain error in failing
to dismiss that claim based on the concession that was made before it.
III.

JOINDER IN THOMAS BRIEF.

Carson and Bustos also join in the arguments advanced by John Thomas in any brief
he may file in connection with these proceedings.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in this brief, and in the Thomas brief, the decision of the trial
court dismissing the amended complaint should be affirmed on the claims addressed here,
and the decision of the Court of Appeals on those claims should be vacated. The case should
be remanded to the trial court solely for the determination of the plaintiffs' fraud claim.
DATED this JO

day of February, 2004.

Keith W. Meade
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
Attorney for Joel Carson

Craig G. Adamson

DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN
Attorney for William Bustos
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P R O C E E D I N G S
MR. STEPHENS:

If it please the Court, I'm

Brent Stephens of the law firm of Snow, Christensen &.
Martineau, and the plaintiff and the appellants in this
case.
And the relief sought here is a reversal,
speedily, I hope, of the granting of the defendants'
and all three of them, motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.
Now, either I was incomprehensible in the
court below, or Judge Frederick became confused as to
what I was claiming, or — probably both, or perhaps
even because of the defendants' sophisticated but
thoughtless arguments.
The motion of the defendants was not well
taken at all.
The facts are these. And this is a
common-law, broad, garden-variety case.
The plaintiffs are developers of real estate
in —

from California originally.

They take plats and

they build houses on them.
Thomas, one of the defendants, who was a
local builder here, was approached by Russell to form a
company called PRP Limited Liability Company, to do the
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.

MR. MEADE:

Well, you have the Frandsen

case, where the period of time was very close to what
we're dealing with here.

I think it was six months.

And that's where we are.
And, again, it's based -- the discovery rule
in the four-year statute is -- is strictly an equitable
instrument that would extend the period of time if you
don't have the opportunity to file it within the
four-year statute of limitations.
JUDGE THORNE:
out the six claims?

So in your view, that washes

We've got two left, is that

right?
•

MR. MEADE:

You've got two left.

JUDGE THORNE: Okay.
MR. MEADE:

So one of the two is the

commercial bribery claim.

And that -- and Mr. Pratt

argued that in the brief.

And it's not really even

been responded to in the briefing.

And I think the

Court needs to assume that the plaintiffs concede that
this commercial bribery claim just doesn't exist,
because --• for the reasons that Mr. Pratt argued in his
brief.
|

Then you have the fraud claim.

And I think

the fraud claim was properly dismissed for a number of
reasons.

One -- only one of which has to do with the
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statute of limitations.
Let me back up —
MR. STEPHENS: We111 concede the commercial
bribery claim.
JUDGE THORNE: Did Judge Frederick explain
why he dismissed these, or are you trying to dealve
into possibilities?
MR. MEADE: Well, he -- I think his ruling
was fairly limited except for the reasons set forth in
the memorandum, and in the arguments.
And I'm not advancing anything that wasn't
argued to Judge Frederick.
I mean, he doesn't -- he did not, it's my
recollection, go into detail on the fraud claim.
I will '-- you know, there was a motion made
inviting him to reconsider his ruling by the plaintiff.
And, you know, I'm sure he looked at it, and
went back, and he ruled, you know, that his prior
ruling stood.
So no more detail than that.
Initially we argued at the trial court, and
argued here, that the fraud claim was not pled with
sufficient particularity, and, more importantly, that
some of the elements of fraud are missing.

Mainly,

that there was some kind of a representation made to
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Russell by any of these defendants.

There is simply no

allegation in the complaint that there was this type of
misrepresentation.
And if Russell was confused, or didn't pay
attention to the details of the transaction, that
doesn't turn it into fraud.
In paragraph 65 of the amended complaint -here is the allegation of misrepresentation.
Defendants represented to Saratoga that CMT
was part of, affiliated with, or owned by the
plaintiffs.
So their fraud claim is based on some
alleged misrepresentation made to the seller, not to
Russell.
Now -- and this was made in an amended
pleading, so I think they have to assume that they're
doing the best they can.
And I think it would be important to
consider the situation of the parties in the
transaction.
Russell is not a party to the transaction.
Russell and Thomas are members of the limited liability
company PRP.
It's admitted in the amended complaint that
Thomas was an agent and fiduciary of Mr. Russell in his
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BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge:
fl
Russell/Packard Development, Inc., and Lawrence Russell
(collectively, Russell) appeal from the district court's order
granting motions to dismiss in favor of Joel Carson, William
Bustos, and John Thomas. We reverse and remand.
BACKGROUND
i[2
In 1996, Lawrence Russell was the principal shareholder and
chief executive officer of Russell/Packard Development, Inc., a
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California corporation1 engaged in real estate development in
California. When Mr. Russell became interested in developing
residential real estate in Utah, he teamed with John Thomas
(Thomas), a Utah real estate agent and a managing member of
Premier Homes, L . C , to organize a Utah limited liability company
called PRP Development, L.C. (PRP). Thomas was the manager of
PRP and hence a fiduciary of Russell and PRP. PRP began pursuing
real estate development activities in Utah.
H3
In 1996, Saratoga Springs Development, L.C. (Saratoga), a
company owned by Lynn Wardley, was developing and marketing land
for residential construction. Saratoga owned seventy-two
undeveloped twin-home lots (the lots) in the city of Saratoga
Springs, Utah. Saratoga retained the brokerage services of
Wardley Better Homes and Gardens Brokerage Co. (Wardley) to
market and sell the lots. Dan Cary (Cary), a Wardley agent, was
the listing agent for the lots. Joel Carson (Carson) and William
Bustos (Bustos) were also real estate agents with Wardley.
Unbeknownst to Russell, Carson had a business relationship with
Bustos and Bustos had previously engaged in real estate dealings
with Thomas. Also unbeknownst to Russell, Thomas owed Bustos
money from previous business dealings. Thomas retained Carson on
behalf of PRP and Russell to locate and review real estate
proposals for purchase and development by PRP. As such, Carson
became a fiduciary of PRP.
1[4
In the summer of 1996, Carson, Thomas, and Bustos learned of
the availability of the Saratoga lots. At the urging of Carson
and Bustos, Thomas approached Cary about purchasing the lots from
Saratoga through PRP.
1|5
However, in the fall of 1996, Carson, Thomas, and Bustos,
through an entity known as CMT, Inc. (CMT), made a separate offer
to purchase the lots from Saratoga for $25,000 per lot. Carson
told Cary that CMT was affiliated with or owned by Russell and
PRP. Throughout the negotiations, Carson and Thomas, through
their actions and representations to Saratoga, created the
appearance that PRP was actively pursuing the purchase of the
lots. Consequently, Wardley and Saratoga believed they were
negotiating the purchase of the lots with PRP directly. To
further disguise CMT's illegitimacy, Carson, Thomas, and Bustos
misappropriated Russell's proprietary plans to develop the lots
and presented them to Saratoga as their own. As a result of the
same conduct, Russell erroneously believed CMT was owned by,
affiliated with, or part of Saratoga.

1. Russell/Packard Development, Inc., was licensed through the
Utah Department of Commerce to do business in Utah as a foreign
corporation.
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f6
In fact, during the negotiations and execution of the PRP
contract, CMT was merely a fictitious name used by Carson,
Thomas, and Bustos, having no legal status in Utah or elsewhere.2
On November 4, 1996, CMT and Saratoga executed a real estate
contract listing Cary as the agent for Saratoga and Carson as the
agent for CMT. The CMT contract was signed by Saratoga's
authorized agent and by "Charles Perez" on behalf of CMT.3
Saratoga and CMT closed on the CMT contract the same day they
executed it, with Saratoga still erroneously believing it was
contracting with PRP through PRP's affiliate, CMT. The title
company CMT used to close the transaction received an earnest
money wire in the amount of $10,000 from an entity known as Poe
Investments, L.C. (Poe), whose members were Carson and Bustos.4
At closing, Bustos received a check for part of this $10,000
earnest money payment.
f7
After the CMT contract closed on November 4, 1996, T h o m a s acting for PRP--made an offer to purchase the lots from CMT for
$3 0,000 per lot. PRP and CMT executed a real estate contract
(the PRP contract) on November 8, 1996. Thomas signed on behalf
of PRP. "Charles Perez" again signed on behalf of CMT. Carson
acted as the real estate agent for both PRP and CMT on the PRP
contract. The terms of the PRP contract were identical to those
of the CMT contract, except that the price per lot was $5,000
higher. By failing to reveal to Russell, PRP, and Saratoga that
they were acting as agents and principals for CMT at the same
time they were acting as agents and fiduciaries of Russell and
PRP, Carson, Thomas, and Bustos successfully effectuated a "flip
purchase and sale," and pocketed $360,000 in the process.
Neither Russell nor Saratoga knew what had occurred. However,
CMT was listed as the seller both in the PRP contract and in the
chain of title on the lots.
IfS
In spring 2000, an accountant for Saratoga questioned CMT's
true role in the 1996 transactions involving the lots.5
2. CMT, Inc. was incorporated as a California corporation on
December 5, 1996, after the CMT contract was signed. CMT has
never been registered to do business in the state of Utah.
3. A person named "Charles Perez" is believed to have been
associated with CMT, though Russell alleges it is unsure how.
4. Poe was organized in Utah on July 19, 1996, and involuntarily
dissolved on August 22, 1997.
5. By this time, Russell and Thomas had dissolved PRP. In the
1997 dissolution, Russell purchased all rights, title, and
interest in the PRP contract, including the right to purchase the
(continued...)
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Suspecting a "flip purchase and sale" had occurred, Saratoga
initiated discussions with Russell wherein Russell learned for
the first time that CMT was not an agent for Saratoga.
Subsequently, Russell conducted further investigation concerning
the ownership and control of CMT and the circumstances
surrounding PRP's purchase of the lots.
H9
On November 30, 2001, Russell filed a complaint against
Carson, Thomas, and Bustos alleging fraud, breach of fiduciary
duty as to Carson and Thomas, civil conspiracy to defraud,
commercial bribery, unjust enrichment, conversion and
misappropriation of proprietary property, breach of .principal.agent relationship as to Carson and Thomas, and intentional
interference with prospective economic relations. Carson,
Thomas, and Bustos filed motions to dismiss asserting a number of
grounds for dismissal. On June 10, 2002, the district court
dismissed Russell's claims with prejudice. Russell appeals.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
HlO Russell argues the district court erred in dismissing its
claims against Carson, Thomas, and Bustos (collectively, the
Appellees). "When determining whether a trial court properly
granted a rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, we accept the factual
allegations in the complaint as true and consider them and all
reasonable inferences to be drawn from them in a light most
favorable to the plaintiff." Saint Benedict's Dev. Co. v. Saint
Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991). "Because the
propriety of a 12(b) (6) dismissal is a question of law, we give
the trial court's ruling no deference and review it under a
correctness standard." Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263,
264 (Utah 1995) (quotations and citations omitted). We "will
affirm the trial court's decision only if it appears [Russell]
cannot prove any set of facts in support of [its] claims."
Dansie v. Anderson Lumber Co.. 878 P.2d 1155, 1156 (Utah Ct. App.
1994). 6

5 . ( ...continued)
lots pursuant to the terms of the contract.
6. The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide that "[t]he
[district] court shall . . . issue a brief written statement of
the ground for its decision on all motions granted under . . .
12(b)." Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) (citing Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)).
While rule 52(a) allows for brevity in such supporting
statements, we have specifically condemned the practice employed
by the district court in this case wherein the court merely
grants the motion "for the reasons set forth in the [prevailing
(continued...)
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ANALYSIS
I.
A.

Timeliness of Claims

Statutes of Limitations

Ull Under Utah law, Russell's claim for fraud is subject to a
three-year statute of limitations. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-1226(3) (2002). Russell's claims for breach of fiduciary duty,
civil conspiracy, unjust enrichment, conversion and
misappropriation, breach of principal-agent relation, and
intentional interference with prospective economic relations
(collectively, the four-year claims) are subject to a four-year
statute of limitations. See id. § 78-12-25(3) (2002). Russell
concedes that, absent tolling, its fraud claim expired on
November 7, 1999, its four-year claims expired on November 7,
2000, and thus its November 30, 2001 complaint was untimely.
B.

The Discovery Rule

1J12 In most cases "a cause of action accrues" and the "statutes
of limitations begin running upon the happening of the last event
necessary to complete the cause of action." Spears v. Warr, 2002
UT 24,1(33, 44 P.3d 742 (quotations and citations omitted).
Moreover, "mere ignorance of the existence of a cause of action
does not prevent the running of the statute of limitations."
Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah 1992)
(quotations and citations omitted). Russell concedes that,
absent tolling through application of the discovery rule, "the
point at which [Russell] reasonably should [have] known" of its
legal injuries is November 8, 1996, the day PRP and CMT executed
the PRP contract. Spears, 2002 UT 24 at 132.
Kl3 However, in some cases, "the discovery rule tolls the
limitations period until facts forming the basis for the cause of
action are discovered." Id. Utah courts apply the discovery
rule
(1) in situations where the discovery rule is
mandated by statute; (2) in situations where
6. (...continued)
party's] supporting memorandum . .'. [without] explain[ing] the
basis for its decision." Gabriel v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2001
UT App 277,1(9, 34 P. 3d 234. Given the complexity of the issues
in this case, we could reverse and remand based solely on the
district court's failure to explain the basis of its decision.
However, in the interest of expediting this case, we proceed to
the merits. Nonetheless, we urge trial courts to explain the
basis of their decisions when there are multiple issues before
the court.

onnonRAa-rA
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•a plaintiff does not become aware of the
" cause of action because of the defendant's
concealment or misleading conduct; and (3) in
situations where the case presents
exceptional circumstances and the application
of the general rule would be irrational or
unjust, regardless of any showing that the
defendant has prevented the discovery of the
cause of action.
Id. (quoting Warren, 83 8 P.2d at 112 9). Russell contends the
limitation periods were tolled because: (1) the discovery rule
applies to a claim for fraud by statutory mandate; and (2) the
Appellees' concealment justifies application of the concealment
prong of uhe discovery rule to Russell's four-year claims.
1.

Fraudulent Concealment

^14 In Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45 (Utah 1996), our supreme
court noted that in cases not involving- allegations of
concealment, inquiry notice on the part of the plaintiff is
enough to trigger the running of the limitations period. See id.
at 51-52 (citing United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City,
Co., 870 P.2d 880, 889 (Utah 1993) (refusing to toll the statute
of limitations where a proxy statement provided sufficient
information to put shareholders on notice of the need for further
inquiry)). Hence, absent concealment, the statutes of
limitations on Russell's claims began running in 1996 when
Russell was put on notice of CMT's involvement by the PRP
contract's closing papers and the subsequently recorded deeds.
See Johannessen v. Canyon Road Towers Owners Ass'n, 2002 UT App
332,1(23,. 57 P. 3d 1119 ("Constructive notice is imparted when
documents are properly recorded." (quotations and citation
omitted)).
Hl5 "However, under our case law the rule is otherwise when a
plaintiff alleges that a defendant took affirmative steps to
conceal the plaintiff's cause of action . . . ." Berenda, 914
P.2d at 51. In such a situation, the concealment prong of the
discovery rule applies to toll the statute of limitations on the
plaintiff's claims, regardless of inquiry or constructive notice.
See Seale v. Gowans, 923 P.2d 1361, 1365 (Utah 1996). "[U]nder
the discovery rule, 'it is the knowledge of injury' which
triggers the statute, 'not notice of probable or possible
injury.'" Id. (citation omitted). If the plaintiff can make "a
prima facie showing of fraudulent concealment and then
demonstrate that, given the defendant's actions, a reasonable
plaintiff would not have discovered the claim earlier," the
statute of limitations is tolled. Berenda, 914 P.2d at 51
(citing Vincent v. Salt Lake County, 583 P.2d 105, 107 (Utah
1978) (holding that the plaintiff's reasonable reliance on the
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defendant's misrepresentations tolled the statute of limitations
until discovery of the cause of the damage) (other citations
omitted)). 7
a.

Threshold Issue

fl6 "The first step in determining whether the discovery rule
applies is to examine whether [Russell] made the threshold
showing that [Russell] did not know, nor should have known," of

7. The Appellees continue to argue that because Russell was put
on notice of its claims in spring of 2000--several months before
the four-year statutes of limitations expired in summer 2000-Russell was obligated to file its complaint before the running of
the statute. The Appellees reason that because Russell did not
file its complaint until November 2001, Russell's claims are
time-barred. To support this reasoning, the Appellees cite
Atwood v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 823 P.2d 1064 (Utah 1992) and
Brigham Young Univ. v. Paulsen Construction Co., 744 P.2d 1370
(Utah 1987) . However, both of these cases are factually
distinguishable from this case because neither involved
allegations of fraudulent concealment.
In Atwood, the supreme court held that "[w]hile the
discovery rule has often been applied to give a plaintiff the
opportunity to file his action after learning certain critical
facts, the discovery rule has no application here" where the
plaintiff "d[id] not suggest any reason why the action could not
have been filed between the spring of 1988"--when the plaintiff
learned of his cause of action--"and October 11 of that year"-when the statute of limitations expired on his claim. 823 P.2d
at 1065. Unlike the plaintiff in Atwood, Russell has alleged
fraudulent concealment as the reason Russell could not file its
claims prior to summer 2000.
In Brigham Young, the supreme court refused to apply the
discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations because the
plaintiff "knew of its cause of action . . . three and a half
years before the limitations period expired," and where "an
action easily could have been filed between the date of discovery
and the end of the limitation period." 744 P.2d at 1374. Again,
unlike Russell, the plaintiff in Brigham Young did not allege
fraudulent concealment as a justification for filing suit after
the statute of limitations ostensibly expired.
Hence, in Atwood and Brigham Young, the supreme court
refused to apply the discovery rule because there were no _
allegations of fraud and because in both cases the plaintiffs
could have""filed" prior to the running of the limitations period.
Our reading of Utah law leads us to conclude that this rule does
not apply here where Russell alleged fraudulent concealment. As
we discuss in detail later in this section, we conclude that
Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45 (Utah 1996), controls this case.
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its causes of action against the Appellees prior to being put on
notice of a potential fraudulent transaction by Saratoga in
spring 2000. Sevy v. Security Title Co., 902 P.2d 629, 634 (Utah
1995); see also O'Neal v. Division of Family Servs., 821 P.2d
1139, 1144 (Utah 1991) (noting that "a threshold showing that
[the plaintiff] did not know and could not reasonably have known
of the existence of a cause of action . . . seem[s] a
definitional prerequisite to reliance on any version of the
discovery rule").
Hi 7 The Utah Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff's actual
knowledge of a cause of action prevents the plaintiff from
satisfying the threshold showing. See O'Neal, 821 P.2d at 1144
(citing, Brigham Young Univ. v. Paulsen Constr. Co., 744 P.2d
1370, 1374 (Utah 1983); Auerbach Co. v. Key Sec. Police, Inc.,
680 P.2d 740, 743-44 (Utah 1984); Becton Dickinson & Co. v.
Reese, 668 P.2d 1254, 1257 (Utah 1987); Lord v. Shaw, 665 P.2d
1288, 1290-91 (Utah 1983)). In the case before us, neither partyalleges, nor does the record reflect, that Russell had or should""*
have had actual knowledge of its claims against the Appellees at
the time of the execution of the PRP contract.
Hi8 However, there is no dispute that the PRP contract and the
deeds for the lots indicate CMT's involvement in the transactions. The Appellees argue that because CMT was named in
these documents, Russell should have been aware of its injury and
cannot satisfy the threshold showing.
1Jl9 The case of S e w v. Security Title Co., 902 P. 2d 629 (Utah
1995), is instructive. In Sevy, the plaintiffs satisfied the
threshold showing even where there were "some undisputed facts
indicat[ing] that [the plaintiffs] should have become aware of
their injury at closing." Id. at 634, 636 (quotations and
'citation omitted). In that case, the plaintiff was awarded
damages by the district court for a title company's negligent
failure to deliver stock certificates to the plaintiff at
closing, pursuant to the terms of a real estate purchase
contract.
See id. at 631. Even though the statute of
limitations would normally have run on the plaintiff's claim, the
plaintiff asserted the discovery rule applied to toll the statute
of limitations. See id. at 634. The plaintiff contended that he
met the discovery rule's threshold showing--that he did not and

8. Because the certificates were never delivered, the
plaintiff's security interest in the shares was not perfected and
because of subsequent transfers of the stock certificates, a
third party sought to foreclose on the stock and sued to have the
district court declare the third party's security interest was
valid, perfected, and free from claims by the plaintiff. See
S e w v. Security Title Co., 902 P.2d 629, 631 (Utah 1995).
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should not have known of the negligence at the time of closing-because the recording of a trust deed led him to believe his
security interest was perfected regardless of the defendant title
company's failure to deliver the stock certificates. See id. at
636. The defendant title company argued that the plaintiff
should have known of the negligence, and that his security
interest was not perfected at closing when no stock certificates
were forthcoming. See id. at 634. Noting that the district
court's finding was a question of fact, see id. at 634, the Sevy
court affirmed the district court's ruling, holding that despite
evidence tending to show that the plaintiff should have known of
his claim upon the defendant title company's failure to deliver
the stock certificates, the plaintiff "neither knew nor should
have known of [the defendant title company's] negligence until
after the statute of limitations period had run." Id. at 636.
^20 Similarly in our case, Russell alleges that despite the
presence of CMT's name in the closing documents and the recorded
deeds, Russell did not and should not have known of its claims at
closing, and therefore that the threshold requirement is met for
application of the discovery rule. Russell argues it is
commonplace to use multiple legal entities in complex development
transactions, and therefore the Appellees' use of CMT's name did
not, of itself, alert Russell of any potential or actual
problems. Because of the standard of review on a rule 12(b)(6)
dismissal, we accept Russell's assertions that it should not have
known of its claims simply because CMT was listed in the PRP
contract and the deeds. Hence, we conclude Russell has satisfied
the threshold showing for purposes of surviving a motion to
dismiss.
b.

The Concealment Prong of the Discovery Rule

1(21 Our supreme court has held that application of the
concealment prong of the discovery rule to toll a statute of
limitations requires the plaintiff to "make a prima facie showing
of fraudulent concealment and then demonstrate that, given the
defendant's actions, a reasonable plaintiff would not have
discovered his or her claim earlier." Berenda v. Langford, 914
P.2d 45, 53 (Utah 1996). This standard requires consideration of
"the difficulty a plaintiff may have in recognizing and
diligently discovering a cause of action when a defendant
affirmatively and fraudulently conceals it." Id. at 54.
Significantly, the Berenda court "explicitly acknowledge[d] that
weighing the reasonableness of the plaintiff's conduct in light
of the defendant's steps to conceal the cause of action
necessitates the type of factual findings which preclude summary
judgment in all but the clearest of cases." Id. at 53. "Close
calls are for juries, not judges, to make." Id. at 54
(quotations and citations omitted).
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f22 To support the contention that the Appellees concealed their
wrongful conduct after defrauding Russell via the "flip purchase
and sale," Russell alleges in its complaint that:
[] At the time the CMT contract, signed
on November 4, 1996, and the PRP contract,
signed on November 8, 1996, were executed,
Carson, Bustos, and Thomas set on a course of
conduct through agreement to conceal from
plaintiffs and Saratoga CMT's relationship to
the defendants and CMT's lack of relationship
to the plaintiffs and Saratoga.
[] This concealment was a necessary
part of the scheme and device to permit the
CMT contract to be signed by Saratoga on
November 4, 1996, and to "flip the sale" to
PRP on November 8, 1996.
[] This intentional concealment and
failure to disclose to plaintiffs the fact
that CMT was not owned by or controlled
through Saratoga or, as to Saratoga, CMT was
not owned by or in the control of plaintiffs,
plaintiffs and Saratoga would not have
permitted the flip purchase and sale through
CMT while Carson and Thomas were acting as
agents and fiduciaries of plaintiffs or to
benefit Bustos.
[] Plaintiffs did not discover that CMT
was not the agent for . . . Saratoga, in
connection with the sale of the lots, until
spring of 2000, when an accountant working
for Saratoga discovered the possibility of a
flip sale and purchase which prompted
discussions between Russell on the one hand, and a representative of Saratoga on the other
hand.
[] At all times previous to that,
defendant formulated a scheme in which
plaintiffs were introduced to Saratoga by the
defendants and always referred to as the
builder or buyer, and Saratoga's
representatives were introduced to plaintiffs
by the defendants and always referred to as
the seller or developer.
[] On information and belief, in the
spring of 2000, an accountant for Saratoga
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questioned the ownership or control status of
CMT, in connection with the . . . closing of
the last twelve lots [under the PRP
contract].

[] This affirmative conduct and
concealment of the defendants constituted a
pattern during October and November 1996
during the sale and continued thereafter
through spring of 20 00 that CMT was known
only to plaintiffs as Saratoga's agent or
company owned by or under the control of
Saratoga. The active concealment continued
until spring of 2000 by the defendants.
[] After the conversation with
Saratoga's representatives concerning CMT's
actual status, further inquiry and
investigations were made by plaintiffs
concerning the ownership and control of CMT
and the circumstances of the two contracts
signed in November 1996 by plaintiffs and
Saratoga.
H23 We look to pertinent case law for guidance in determining
whether these allegations are sufficient to support fraudulent
concealment by the Appellees and reasonable action in the face
thereof by Russell.
124 In Hill v. Allred, 2001 UT 16, 28 P.3d 1271, the district
court granted summary judgment9 in favor of the defendants on the

9. Only in the context of summary judgment have Utah appellate
courts addressed the issue of whether a plaintiff successfully
made the prima facie showing of fraudulent concealment and then
demonstrated that, in light of the defendant's actions, a
reasonable plaintiff would not have discovered the cause of
action sooner. In such cases, Utah appellate courts examined the
pleadings and factual evidence relating to when the plaintiffs
would reasonably have been on notice that further inquiry was
needed and whether the plaintiff, once on notice, reasonably
should have discovered the facts despite the defendants' efforts
to hide them. See, e.g. , Hill v. Allred, 2001 UT 16,1118-20, 28
P.3d 1271; Berenda v. Langsford, 914 P.2d 45, 51, 54 (Utah 1996);
Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1130-31 (Utah 1992);
Chapman v. Primary Children's Hosp., 784 P.2d 1181, 1184 (Utah
1989). In this case, however, we are reviewing a grant of a
(continued...)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

<

4

|

basis of an expired statute of limitations. See id. at ^1.
On
appeal, the supreme court found that the plaintiff "met her
burden of making a prima facie showing of fraudulent concealment"
where the plaintiff submitted affidavits from five different
people to bolster her allegations that the defendants had taken
affirmative steps to conceal her cause of action. Id. at Kl9.
'She also alleged two meetings in which the defendants lied to her
regarding the whereabouts of her stolen money. See id.
Accordingly, the supreme court reversed summary judgment and
remanded for the district court to weigh the reasonableness of
the plaintiff's conduct in the face of the defendant's fraudulent
concealment to determine whether the concealment prong of the
discovery rule applied to toll the statute of limitations on the
plaintiff's claims. See id. at ilHl7-22.
i|25 At first glance, the concealment in Hill appears more
egregious than the concealment pled by Russell in this case.
However, on closer examination, Carson and Thomas had fiduciary
obligations to Russell with the attendant "duty to speak the
truth." Chapman v. Primary Children's Hosp., 784 P.2d 1181, 0-186
(Utah 1989). Therefore, material omissions such as Carson's and
Thomas's failure to disclose to Russell the true involvement of -CMT are similar to the defendant's lies in Hill.
1)26 Likewise, in Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45 (Utah 1996),
the supreme court reversed a grant of summary judgment after the
district court refused to apply the concealment prong of the
discovery rule. See id. at 47, 50. In that case, the defendant
asked our supreme court to affirm because, in the defendant's
view, two letters written by the plaintiff evincing suspicion of
the defendant's wrongful conduct were enough to start the statute
of limitations running such that the plaintiff's claims were
time-barred.10 See id. at 50. The supreme court reversed and

9. (...continued)
motion to dismiss and hence our standard of review is more
deferential to the plaintiff. We "must accept the factual
allegations in the complaint as true and consider all reasonable
inferences . . . from those facts in a light most favorable to
the plaintiff." Prows v. State, 822 P.2d 764, 766 (Utah 1991).
We think the posture of this case weighs heavily in favor of
reversal.
10. Berenda 914 P.2d 45 (Utah 1996) was decided under a statute
of limitations that contained an internal discovery rule like the
fraud statute in this case. See id. at 51 n.2. Nevertheless,
the court looked to case law decided under statutes of
limitations without internal discovery rules because the
plaintiff's allegations that the defendants fraudulently
(continued...)
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remanded where the plaintiff "presented a prima facie case" of
fraudulent -concealment because "weighing the reasonableness of
the plaintiff's conduct" in the face of fraudulent concealment to
determine whether the statute of limitations was tolled is the
province of juries rather than judges. Id, at 53-54.
127 In Chapman, our supreme court faced a "close call." 784
P.2d at 1186. There, the plaintiffs moved to dismiss without
prejudice their own malpractice suit against a physician after
the defendants allegedly misled and misinformed the plaintiffs
about the viability of their claim. See id. at 1183. After
receiving medical records containing the facts underlying their
cause of action, the plaintiffs later renewed their malpractice
suit, but only after the statute normally would have run. See
id. at 1183-84. Balancing the misinformation the plaintiffs
allegedly received against the actions of the plaintiffs in light
of this misinformation, the Chapman court determined the
plaintiffs were "entitled to their day in court" and reversed a
grant of summary judgment. Id. at 1186. The court left for the
jury the determination of whether, given the defendant's
concealment, the plaintiffs "were sufficiently alerted to the
possibility of medical malpractice at the time of [their
daughter's] cardiac arrest to start the statute of limitations
running or whether . . . [the plaintiffs] should reasonably have
disregarded [the misinformation] and made an independent
inquiry." Id. In essence, the court left for the fact-finder
the determination of whether or not to apply the discovery rule.
1|28 Russell's pleadings, set out above, clearly allege that the
Appellees mislead and misinformed Russell as to CMT's true nature
and involvement in the sale of the lots. Under our standard of
review in a grant of a rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, and in light of
the foregoing authority regarding the fact-finder's role in
determining the applicability of the discovery rule, we hold the
district court erred in granting the Appellees' motions to
dismiss. n
•

10.
(...continued)
concealed the plaintiff's claims required the court in either
case to "balance[] the reasonableness of the plaintiff in
pursuing its claim against the defendant's affirmative actions to
conceal." Id. at 52.
11. Because Russell's fraud claim is governed by a statute of
limitations that includes an internal discovery rule, our
analysis differs slightly from the foregoing concealment prong
analysis. The pertinent statutory language provides that "[a]n
action may be brought within three years . . . for relief on the
ground of fraud or mistake,* except that the cause of action in
(continued...)
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II.

Standing as to Fraud Claim

i|2 9 Alternatively, the Appellees argue the district court
properly dismissed Russell's fraud claim because Russell lacks
standing to bring the claim.12 Russell alleges in the pleadings
that when PRP was dissolved in 1997, PRP assigned to Russell "all
of its rights, title and interest in the [PRP] Contract."
Russell argues this assignment "includ[ed] any claims relating to
the purchase of [the] lots." The Appellees argue, inter alia,
that Russell lacks standing because it could not have legally
acquired a cause of action for fraud from PRP-through assignment.<

11.
(...continued)
such case does not accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved
party of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake." Utah Code
Ann. § 78-12-26(3) (2002) (emphasis added). Interpreting this
statute, our supreme court held that "accrual of the cause of
action is not complete until discovery of the pertinent facts"
constituting the fraud. Hill, 2001 UT 16 at 1|l6 (citing Utah
Code Ann. § 78-12-26(3)). Hence, despite the Appellees'
arguments to the contrary, "the question is not whether the '
discovery rule applies [to the fraud claim,] but [rather] when
[Russell] discovered [its] cause of action [for fraud] and so
triggered the running of the statute." Berenda, 914 P.2d at 56.
As we have discussed above, determining when the statute of
limitations began running is a fact question and, accordingly, we
hold the district court erred in granting the Appellees' motions
to dismiss the fraud claim.
12. The Appellees argue Russell's fraud claim does not pass
muster under rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
which requires fraud be pleaded with particularity. See Utah R.
Civ. P. 9(b). To support this assertion, the Appellees argue,
inter alia, that Russell failed to allege that the Appellees made
direct misrepresentations to Russell with regard to the
transactions involving the lots. However, the question is not
one of direct misrepresentations, but rather one of false
representations. See Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon, 746 P.2d
785, 792 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) ("A person cannot be liable for
fraud unless he made the false representations himself,
authorized someone to make them for him, or participated in the
misrepresentation in some way, such as through a conspiracy.");
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 533 (1965) ("The maker of a
fraudulent misrepresentation is subject to liability for
pecuniary loss to another who acts in justifiable reliance upon
it if the misrepresentation, although not made directly to the
other, is made to a third person and the maker intends or has
reason to expect that its terms will be repeated or its substance
communicated to the other, and that it will influence his conduct
in the transaction . . . ." (emphasis added)).
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Accordingly, we must determine whether a fraud claim is
assignable in Utah.
H30 We conclude that Mayer v. Rankin, 91 Utah 193, 63 P.2d 611
(1936), is controlling in this appeal. The facts and procedural
posture of Mayer are strikingly similar to those we face here.
In Mayer, the plaintiff brought a claim against the defendant for
fraud alleging that the defendant "'devised a scheme to defraud
the plaintiff's assignors . . . by selling them stock . . . at
false and fictitious values.'" Id. at 613. Based on the
defendant's misrepresentations, the plaintiff's assignors
purchased the stock at a price higher than its actual trading
value, providing the defendant with significant ill-gotten
profits. See id. at 613-614. The defendant moved to dismiss the
plaintiff's action, asserting the plaintiff lacked standing to
bring the fraud claim because a cause of action for fraud was not
assignable. See id. at 612, 616. The supreme court noted that
although tort claims were not assignable at common law, "the rule
of nonassignability no longer extends to all actions arising [in
tort]" under Utah law. Id. (citing Wines v. Rio Grande W. Ry.
Co., 9 Utah 228, 33 P. 1042, 1045 (1893) (holding that an action
for negligent destruction of property is assignable); National
Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Denver & R.G.R. Co., 44 Utah 26, 137 P.
653, 654 (1913) (same); Lawler v. Jennings, 18 Utah 35, 55 P. 60,
61 (1898) (holding that an action for money overpaid by mutual
mistake is assignable) ; Bacrlin v. Earl-Eagle Min. Co., 54 Utah
572, 184 P. 190, 193 (1919) (holding that a cause of action for
conversion is assignable)). The Mayer court also pointed out
that the Utah Supreme Court had previously held an action to
recover stock secured by fraud was an assignable claim. Id. at
616 (citing White v. Texas Co., 59 Utah 180, 202 P. 826, 830
(1921)) . In light of these prior holdings, the Mayer court could
find "no good reason why an action for the recovery of money
secured by fraud is not likewise assignable." Id. The Mayer
court held that "[w]hile a mere naked right to recover for fraud
is not assignable, . . . the weight of authority and . . . sound
legal principles [persuade us that] an assignment is upheld when
it carries with it a subsisting substantial right to property
independent of the right to sue for fraud." Id. at 616-17. The
supreme court reversed the district court's dismissal and
remanded the case with instructions to reinstate the plaintiff's
fraud claim. See id. at 618.
1f3l We find Mayer indistinguishable from the present appeal.
Just as in Mayer, Russell alleges that the Appellees' fraudulent
misrepresentations induced PRP to execute a real estate purchase
contract in which PRP agreed to pay a higher price for the
property than that for which it was presently selling. Like the
defendant in Mayer, the Appellees pocketed the ill-gotten profit
at the plaintiff's expense. In both cases, the property that the
plaintiffs seek to recover through their fraud claims is the
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money "had [by the plaintiffs] and received [fraudulently by the
defendants]." Id. at 616. And like the plaintiff in Mayer,
Russell brought its fraud claim in the capacity of an assignee.
Thus, applying Mayer, we reverse the dismissal on the fraud claim
and allow Russell to pursue its claims against the Appellees.
III.

Fiduciary Duty as to Bustos

f32 Russell contends the district court erred in dismissing
Russell's claims against Bustos. Bustos argues that he could not
have defrauded Russell because he never made any kind of
representation to PRP or Russell. Also, Bustos insists he owed
PRP and Russell no duty as a fiduciary, and that he therefore had
no duty to reveal his knowledge of the fraudulent scheme.
1(33 Generally, "silence . . . in the absence of a duty to speak
. . . does not of itself constitute fraud." 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 18
(1997) (footnotes and citations omitted); cf. Jenson v. IHC
Hosps., Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 333 (Utah 1997) ("The party's silence
must amount to fraud."). However, "[a]n exception to the
[general] rule . . . exists where the circumstances impose on a
person a duty to speak and he or she deliberately remains
silent." 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 19 (footnote and citation omitted);
see Jenson, 944 P.2d at 333. Furthermore, "[p]arties who
knowingly join a fiduciary in fraudulent acts, whereby the
fiduciary breaches his or her fiduciary duties, are jointly and
severally liable with that fiduciary." 37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraud and
Deceit, § 306 (2001) (citing Future Group, II v. Nationsbank, 478
S.E.2d 45 (S.C. 1996) (stating "[t]he gravamen of the claim [of
aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty] is the
defendant's knowing participation in the fiduciary's breach."));
see also United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City Co., 870
P.2d 880, 884-885 (Utah 1993) (reviewing a grant of summary
judgment involving a cause of action for aiding and abetting a
fraud by breach of fiduciary duty).
134 Russell alleges in its complaint that: (1) Bustos schemed
with Thomas and Carson to purchase the lots and fraudulently
resell them to PRP; (2) Bustos made overt acts and
representations to induce Saratoga to sell the lots to CMT in the
belief that CMT was affiliated with PRP; (3) Bustos, along with
Carson and Thomas, made an offer to purchase the lots from
Saratoga through CMT for $25,000 per lot; (4) Bustos converted
and used Russell's proprietary development plans to further
disguise CMT's illegitimacy; (5) Bustos was a member of Poe, the
company that sent a $10,000 earnest money wire to the title
company to close the CMT contract; (6) Bustos received money in
the form of a check at the closing of the CMT contract; (7)
Bustos agreed to conceal from PRP the true nature of the "flip
purchase and sell" of the lots; (8) Bustos was a real estate
agent for Wardley along with Cary and Carson, both of whom
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represented PRP; and (9) Bustos interjected himself, along with
Carson and Thomas, as undisclosed agents and principals for CMT
and Poe, while acting as agents and fiduciaries of PRP.
1(3 5 Based on these allegations and reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom, we accept that Bustos made overt acts and
representations for the purpose of inducing PRP to execute the
PRP contract. We also accept that Bustos schemed with the
Appellees to commit fraud and later agreed to conceal the fraud
in furtherance of the scheme. Likewise, we accept that Bustos
aided Carson and Thomas in breaching their fiduciary duties
toward PRP.13 Accordingly, we reverse the dismissal of the fraud
claim against Bustos and remand for further proceedings.
CONCLUSION
1(3 6 For the purposes of surviving a rule 12(b) (6) motion to
dismiss, we conclude the concealment prong of the discovery rule
applies to toll the statutes of limitations on Russell's claims
such that Russell's complaint was timely. Because Utah law
allows the assignment of a fraud claim, we conclude Russell has
standing to bring its cause of action for fraud. Finally, we
hold that Russell's allegations that Bustos committed fraud
either by making false representations or by breaching fiduciary
duties are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. In short,
we are not convinced that Russell cannot prove any set of facts

13. Russell alleges that Bustos did owe fiduciary duties to PRP.
In the posture of this case, we agree. Bustos was a real estate
agent with Wardley. Both Cary and Carson were Wardley agents at
the time the PRP contract was negotiated and executed. Cary
listed the lots and Carson represented PRP in its attempts to
purchase the lots. Bustos communicated with both Cary and Carson
regarding the lots. Bustos received money from transactions
involving the lots. Arguably, Bustos was an agent for PRP
because Wardley represented PRP. In fact, Russell alleges in its
complaint that Bustos "act[ed] as agent[] and fiduciar[y] of
[PRP] at the time the PRP contract was negotiated and executed."
The determination of "[w]hether or not a confidential or
fiduciary relationship exists depends on the facts and
circumstances of each individual case." First Sec. Bank of Utah
v. Banberry Dev. Corp., 786 P.2d 1326, 1332 (Utah 1990)
(quotations and citations omitted).
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to support its claims, and therefore we reverse and remand for
further proceedings.

m

idith M. Billings,
Associate Presiding Judge
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I CONCUR:

William A. Thome «I

1(38

I CONCUR IN THE RESULT:

)fjt<wz%?£

Russell W. Bench, Judge
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